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"THE ORACLE OF THE CRIMINAL CODE"
*By LousE ARBOUR, B.A., LL.L.
Last spring's publication of Paul Weiler's book on the Supreme Court
had been impatiently awaited in legal circles already familiar with his earlier
works. Chapter 4 of In the Last Resort deals with criminal law and pro-
vides, to a certain extent, a synthesis of his writings on the judicial decision-
making process, as applied to the doctrine of mens rea.
At the beginning of the book, Professor Weiler expresses concern that
the cases which he has chosen to discuss may appear biased. In the area of
criminal law this fear is unjustified. His previous studies on mens rea, as well
as the importance of the cases with which he deals, justify proceeding with
this selective analysis. Weiler first discusses the latitude given to the Supreme
Court in deciding whether an offence requires some type of culpable inten-
tion or instead constitutes an offence of strict liability. To this end he com-
pares the cases of Beaver1 and Pierce Fisheries2. He then continues with a
critical analysis of the Supreme Court's contribution to the development of
the doctrine of mens rea within three precise areas of criminal law. He begins
with the defence of intoxication, commenting on the case of George;s then
moves on to Carker', which defines the defense of duress; and ends with a
critique of Trinneer,5 a case concerning the guilt of an accomplice to an
armed robbery which ends in the death of the victim. In fact, Weiler groups
these three themes under two titles: common law defences (intoxication)
and interpretation of the Criminal Code (duress and felony murder). This
approach allows him to better apply his analysis of the substantive criminal
law to the theory that he develops with regard to the scope of the judicial
function. Weiler brings chapter 4 to an end by resuming his commentary on
the legal reasoning of the Supreme Court in tort and criminal law.
In his preface, Weiler clearly sets out his objective: to apply to various
branches of the law his conception of the role which the courts (and more
particularly the court of last instance) ought to take in the fashioning and
evolution of Canadian law. It is this theory, more than particular comments
on any given case, which the reader is asked to appreciate. Weiler presents
his arguments in a style that is clear, incisive and at times even vehement.
If the text is concise, it is never obscure or ambiguous. The effect is to make
it impossible for the reader to avoid the questions that Weiler raises; in fact,
the force of his reasoning makes it difficult to avoid his conclusions as well.
*Ms. Arboor is an Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
I Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531.
2 R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [19711 S.C.R. 5.
8 R. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871.
4 R. v. Carker, [1967] S.C.R. 114.
5 R. v. Trinneer, [1970] S.C.R. 638.
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Weiler's initial focus for discussion is the Supreme Court's contribution
to the distinction between mens rea and strict liability, and it is probably this
section of Chapter 4 which lends itself most to controversy. In comparing
the cases of Beaver6 and Pierce Fisheries7, Weiler praises the pragmatic at-
titude of the Supreme Court, which has led to a reasonable result: a person
accused of illegal possession of narcotics can always raise as a defence the
fact that he did not know the nature of the substance found in his possession,
while a person accused of possession of lobsters below the regulatory size
cannot be acquitted just because he was not aware of the presence of "illegal"
lobsters in his traps. For this person, the offence is one of absolute liability.
While Weiler may agree with the result reached by the Court, he nevertheless
deplores the Court's failure to elaborate, in any meaningful way, the rules
and principles upon which it founds its distinctions.
Opponents of "judicial activism" or, more simply, of the position that
Weiler espouses in favour of the adoption of a more creative role by the
Supreme Court, will find here their first target for attack. The Court has
always assumed that it was the responsibility of Parliament, not the courts,
to decide whether or not an offence should be a crime in the traditional sense
or an offence of strict liability. Mr. Justice Cartwright made the following
statement in his dissenting opinion in Pierce Fisheries:
This suggests the question whether it would not indeed be in the public interest
that whenever it is intended to create an offence of absolute liability the enacting
provision should declare that intention in specific and unequivocal words.8
He was clearly in the same state of mind when he wrote the majority
opinion in Beaver. As he says, Parliament would be entirely within the scope
of its authority in making heroin possession an offence of strict liability, thus
making it of no consequence whether the accused knew that the substance
in his possession was heroin or sugar of milk. However, it would be necessary
for Parliament to express clearly its intention to do away with the require-
ment of mens rea. In this search for the legislature's intention, the Supreme
Court's task is severely restricted by the absence of any coherent legislative
policy on the subject. Weiler, in his earlier writings, had identified this ten-
dency in the Supreme Court to consider the distinction between mens rea
and strict liability as being an essentially legislative, rather than judicial
function.0 While he does not resume the debate on the allocation of powers
between the legislature and the court in this chapter, it is still fairly evident
that Weiler would like to see an improvement in the contribution that the
judicial branch makes to the elaboration of a viable doctrine of strict liability.
Soon after the publication of In the Last Resort the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada published its Studies on Strict Liability.0 This document
expresses a preference for the adoption of a legislative solution to the prob-
0 Supra, note 1.
7 Supra, note 2.
8id. at 12.
9 P. Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea (1971),
49 Can. B. Rev. 280 at 315.
10 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).
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lem of strict liability. The controversy over the allocation of powers in the
creation of strict liability offences has to be resolved before the Supreme
Court can be blamed for the confusion that exists in this area of the criminal
law.
It is interesting to compare the two systems for classifying offences in
Canadian criminal law. The first is now of statutory origin; the second, to
the extent that it can be described as a system, is a judicial creation. Statutory
criminal law is comprised of three categories of offences: indictable, sum-
mary conviction and mixed or hybrid, in which the Crown has a discretion
as to the method of proceeding. Each section of the Criminal Code creating
an offence specifies into which of the three categories the crime falls. This is
equally true for all federal laws containing provisions which create offences.
In addition, it is clear that this legal classification carries with it important
procedural consequences, determining the right of arrest, availability of
interim release mechanisms, selection of the trial court, severity of sentence,
limitation periods, and so on. Of course, one could hardly say that this
system is beyond criticism, and it could do with reform, even in a substan-
tial way. Nevertheless, the attribute of certainty which the system possesses
is its most important characteristic.
Parallel to this statutory system of classification of offences there is
a judicial classification which was set out in Beaver and Pierce Fisheries:
"genuine crimes" on the one hand and offences of strict liability on the
other. This classification is much more fundamental and substantial than
the preceeding one, since it determines not only a procedural mechanism,
but also a system of liability. As Weiler emphasizes, there is considerable
room for judicial creativity in the task of defining the exact dimension of
each of these types of criminal responsibility. What appears unfortunate is
that the Court should still find itself "classifying offences" when the legislature
should clearly express its intention if it wishes to create an unpopular "no
fault crime". Very recently, the Supreme Court involved itself once more
in this pragmatic exercise of classifying offences, coming to the conclusion
that leaving the scene of an accident, contrary to the provisions of the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act, constituted an offence of strict liability." Of
course, one could reproach the Court for its failure to engage in an in-
depth analysis before reaching this decision. Numerous criteria could have
been used to illustrate the distinction, such as the severity of the penalty, the
constitutional authority of the legislative body involved, the stigma attached
to a conviction in these circumstances, the purpose of the legislation, and
the relative difficulty of proving a guilty intention. However, had the offence
been properly identified by the legislature, the Court might have addressed
itself more adequately to the real legal issue raised by the case - that is, the
availability of a defence of mistake of fact against a strict liability offence.
The second part of Professor Weiler's analysis is much less controversial
than the first. At this point he deals with various judgments in which the
Court has discussed the nature of mens rea in offences which require mens
rea as an essential element. Weiler shows in a very convincing fashion that
11 Hill v. The Queen (1974), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (S.e.C.).
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the allocation of functions between the legislative and judicial branches im-
poses on the courts, and more particularly on the Supreme Court, the burden
of elaborating the doctrine of mens rea. In 1954 Parliament enacted that
common law offences were abolished, but that all the principles of the com-
mon law that created a justification or an excuse to an act or a defence to a
charge would continue to be in force, unless they were inconsistent with any
Act of Parliament. Weiler suggests that mens rea is an established judicial
principle, from which the courts must draw rules applicable to a particular
situation. The way in which the Supreme Court discharges this function can
alternate between two operational models: adjudication of disputes or policy-
making. Weiler criticizes the Court for confining itself to deciding disputes,
without making use of that judicial creativity appropriate to the elaboration
of policy.
In order to illustrate his theory Weiler very judiciously chooses three
areas in which the principle of mens rea has been applied, generating each
time a set of rules appropriate to the circumstances. The first subject for
discussion is the Supreme Court's contribution to the elaboration of the de-
fence of drunkenness, a common law defence that emanates directly from
the principle of mens rea. Weiler does little more than repeat the criticisms
that he has already put forth elsewhere on the subject of the distinction
between specific and general intention, except to emphasize once more the
Court's failure to adopt an explicit and satisfactory policy for the criminal
law on the question of intoxication. In this area, the Court is, in effect, per-
fectly free to reflect upon any of the alternative policies that the principle
of mens rea offers in order to come to some determination as to the extent
to which drunkenness can eliminate or reduce criminal responsibility.
The second focus of Weiler's analysis is the defence of duress. One
could have expected a milder criticism of the Supreme Court's lack of
creativity in the interpretation of a codified defence, contained as it is in an
explicit statutory provision. However, that is not the case. Even in the first
paragraph Weiler asks:
How rigidly should the Supreme Court read and apply the century old language
of the Code where it seems to work an injustice in a novel case?12
A reading of Weiler's criticism of the Carker'8 case leaves an impres-
sion that the author deplores the result of the Court's decision more than
the method of reasoning which brought it about. In effect, he criticizes the
Court for failing to look to s. 7 of the Criminal Code and the common law
in order to widen the scope of s. 17 of the Code, which contains the defence
of duress. More than anything else, it seems, he condemns the Court for
upholding Carker's initial conviction.
Compulsion by threats is a codified defence; compulsion by natural
necessity is not. If Carker had acted out of natural necessity (for example,
in order to attract the attention of his guards because they had forgotten to
bring him food), the Court would have had a clear duty to address itself to
the doctrine of mens rea in order to decide if his conduct should be excused
12 it the Last Resort at 109.
13 Supra, note 4.
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in law. Compulsion by threats is the subject of a statutory provision and the
test intended by the legislature is an objective one. The important question
is not whether Carker succumbed to threats which he could not resist; it is
whether he gave way to threats which the legislature considered irresistible;
that is to say, threats of immediate death or bodily harm, caused by a person
present. In the same way the defence of duress is inadmissible with regard
to certain offences, such as murder, treason, and robbery. Carker had dam-
aged a toilet fixture in his prison cell, after being told to do so and threatened
by another inmate who was trying to organize a riot. Section 17 of the
Criminal Code restricts the availability of the defence of duress to cases
where the accused has acted under "compulsion by threats of immediate
death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offense
is committed". Clearly, we have here an example of a statutory limitation
on the doctrine of mens rea which the Court is bound to respect.
When Weiler declares that only a hypocritical society would condemn
an accused man for having succumbed to threats which none of us would
have been able to resist, one's thoughts can just as easily, if not more easily,
turn to the executive power as to the Supreme Court. After all, the legislature
has allowed the courts to have reference to the defences of the common law
"except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or
any other Act of the Parliament of Canada". 14 The executive has much
more flexibility than the courts, as the Crown need not institute proceedings.
The victim, in this instance the government of British Columbia, had no
unquestionable right to obtain judicial reparation for its smashed toilet fix-
ture. The Attorney-General and his agents have an almost total discretion
when it comes to deciding whether or not to prosecute, to stay proceedings
or to withdraw the charge.
Certainly it was not Weiler's intention to put our institutions on trial
in order to determine who is responsible for a miscarriage of justice. It is
probably true that, "in the last resort", it is the Supreme Court which always
has to come to a decision. It is possible that the words "immediate" or
"present" have a totally different meaning when applied in the context of
imprisonment. But unless the Court was prepared to say that "immediate"
meant "as soon as possible" and "present" meant "in the same geographical
ensemble, although without any possibility of physical contact", it seems
that it was impossible to excuse Carker's behaviour.
The final part of Chapter 4 deals with the case of Trinneer,'G in which
the Supreme Court dealt with a charge of murder laid against the accomplice
to an armed robbery which ended with the victim's death. In Trinneer the
Court had engaged in a line of reasoning that could have led to a defensible
result. One could say that s. 213 of the Criminal Code punishes the result,
not the risk. Just as the essential element of manslaughter is found in the
death of the victim, so in examining s. 213 one can conclude that the offence
is completed when there is (as in Trinneer) a robbery and an infliction of
bodily harm. The nature of the offence is determined when death results
14 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 7(3) (emphasis added).
15 upra, note 5.
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therefrom. By the use of s. 21 of the Code one can be a party to man-
slaughter if two people form an intention in common to assault another.
Then if one of them carries out the plan and the victim dies, both are guilty
of manslaughter. The assailant need not have known, for example, that the
victim had a weak heart and that even a slight blow might bring on death.
Any person who assaults another is presumed to know that if the death of
the victim results from the blows, even if the death was neither intended nor
foreseen, the offence becomes manslaughter. According to Trinneer, the ac-
complice is equally guilty of manslaughter. He agreed to the assault. As
soon as it was inflicted, the offence had been committed. Its nature, man-
slaughter rather than assault, or felony murder rather than robbery, was
determined by the victim's death. Thus, the accomplice should have known
that, if the victim died accidentally as a result of the assault committed, he
would become a party to manslaughter. The offence - manslaughter or
felony murder - is foreseeable in law, if not in fact.
What Mr. Trinneer - and the Canadian jurists - did not know was
that if the victim had not died, the wrongdoer could have been found guilty
of attempted murder. It is this point, clearly the implication of a subsequent
Supreme Court decision,'0 which is difficult to harmonize with Trinneer -
although the Court considers Lajoie analogous. If a person inflicts bodily
injury on another in the commission of a robbery, but death does not result
therefrom, he is guilty of attempted murder since if death had resulted there-
from, he would have committed murder. This leaves the door open to the
worst extravagances, including, it seems, to the concept of attempted man-
slaughter and the abolition of all the felonies listed in s. 213, since they all
become attempted murders. The Supreme Court avoided the theory of the
result, barely outlined in Trinneer, in order to return to a theory of risk.
Weiler proposes an explanation for Trinneer - purely speculative in
his own opinion, since the Court satisfied itself with a very formal and
legalistic judgment. Weiler suggests, in effect, that the Court's decision rests
on the intuitive belief that the accomplice should be just as responsible as
the principal actor if he knew that the latter was going to attack the victim
with a weapon. One can postulate that if Weiler had had the chance to
integrate Lajoie with his own analysis he would have rejected even this inter-
pretation. It is rather difficult to rely on common sense in order to explain
how one can attempt to do what one has not foreseen.
In criticizing Trinneer, Weiler played the prophet. The Supreme Court
became involved in an exercise of strict statutory interpretation from which
it risked not being able to free itself except by resort to the fundamental
principle of mens rea in order to overturn its own decisions.
This lengthy commentary carries the risk of perpetuating the myth that
civil lawyers are completely opposed to any concept of judicial creativity and
that they accord an inordinate value to legislative instruments. In the Last
Resort presents a brilliantly sustained thesis; its value is only increased by
the reflection and reactions that it engenders.
10 Laloe v. The Queen (1973), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 618; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 313 (S.C.C.).
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